
LISBOAN Expert Workshop
Dubrovnik, 5th October 2012

**“Relevance of the European External Action Service for the
EU’s policies towards South East Europe”**

BOOK OF ABSTRACTS

© 2013 IRMO

ISBN
978-953-6096-67-1

Published by:

Institute for Development and International Relations (IRMO) Zagreb,¹ 2013

Editor:

Hrvoje Butković

Language editor:

Brett Campbell

For the publisher:

Sanja Tišma

This project has been funded with support from the European Commission. This publication reflects the views only of the authors, and the Commission cannot be held responsible for any use which may be made of the information contained therein.

¹ In 2013 the Institute changed its name from the Institute for International Relations (IMO) to the Institute for Development and International Relations (IRMO).

Contents

Foreword.....	4
Workshop Report.....	7
<i>Wolfgang Koeth</i> Streamlining of policies or additional level of complexity? The impact of the EEAS on EU - Western Balkans relations.....	14
<i>Tanja Tammianen</i> Impact of EU crisis management efforts in the Western Balkans	18
<i>Michele Comelli</i> Looking for coherence in European foreign policy: The European External Action Service and the Balkans	21
<i>Intes Troha Brdar</i> European External Action Service and the Western Balkan region: What has the new Service brought to the region?	25
<i>Valentin Petroussenko</i> Remaining challenges in the Western Balkans.....	28
<i>Atila Eralp and Zerrin Torun</i> Re-visiting EU-Turkey relations in light of the Lisbon Treaty	30
<i>Senada Šelo Šabić</i> Power-sharing between the EUSR and OHR in Bosnia and Herzegovina	33
<i>Jovan Teokarević</i> Has EU foreign policy become more coherent and coordinated?: The case of the EEAS in the Kosovo crisis.....	36
Workshop Program	39

Foreword

This publication brings together the extended abstracts and the overview of the presentations and discussions at the workshop “Relevance of the European External Action Service for the EU’s policies towards South East Europe” which was organised on October 5, 2012 in Dubrovnik, Croatia by the Institute for Development and International Relations (IRMO), Zagreb. The workshop is one of the activities of the ERASMUS project “LISBOAN, Linking Interdisciplinary Integration Studies by Broadening the European Network,” coordinated by the University of Cologne in which the IRMO is a partner. The workshop brought together experts in the field of EU foreign policy to discuss implications of the newly established European External Action Service (EEAS) for the region of South East Europe.

Introduced by the Lisbon Treaty, the EEAS has been operative for more than two years. The intentions behind the EEAS were to make foreign policy formulation and decision making process across the EU more coherent and integrated, to improve the EU’s position in relation to external partners and to improve EU representation and foreign policy implementation on the ground. The Service was founded on the idea of cooperation between Member States and EU institutions, with the intention of developing a common “European diplomatic culture”. This is a considerably ambitious goal given that the Lisbon Treaty did not affect significant changes in the areas of foreign and security policy; such policies remain to a large extent intergovernmental, or rather within the competencies of EU Member States.

Since its establishment, the Service has been faced with criticism but perhaps it is too early to say as the new system is still being created. Therefore, it requires additional time before definite assessments on its usefulness and effectiveness can be made. Financial crisis certainly doesn’t represent a favourable context for building a new diplomatic service. Furthermore, tensions between the EU-led diplomatic framework and foreign policies of some Member States could be anticipated as some Member States may insist on pursuing their own foreign policy goals which in some cases may differ from that of the EU.

The South Eastern Europe (SEE) represents an important geo-strategic area for the EEAS. The EU claims a political and operational lead in the region and therefore finds itself under increased pressure to exercise more unified foreign policy approach. This is particularly important having in mind weak state capacities in most of the countries which are related to numerous other problems such as ethnic tensions, problems in peace keeping, increased presence of corruption and the organized crime. South East Europe continues to be a compelling geographic area for the EU, as all of the countries continue

along the path toward eventual EU membership. In that context the EEAS could help to maximise EU presence in the SEE and impact positive political developments in the region. It could help in overcoming administrative divisions between the various EU institutions and play an important role not only in producing more unified approaches to the region but also in providing necessary strategic backing that would encourage further enlargement.

Burdening the EEAS program in the SEE region is dichotomy of duties within the EU; specifically, enlargement remains a Commission-led process, while CFSP/CSDP is controlled by the Member States. This puts the SEE on the crossroads of foreign and enlargement policy and it is often difficult to say where the competence of DG Enlargement stops and that of the EEAS begins. In the EU delegations, for example, the political sections respond to the EEAS while operations respond to DG Enlargement. In these circumstances CSDP missions represent an added dimension that should be analysed. Different missions such as EULEX in Kosovo or EUFOR Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina need to align its mission objectives with the EU's broader political aims in order for the EU to act with more coherence.

Completing Croatia's accession process represents a tremendous step-forward for the EU's enlargement policy and sends a positive message to rest of the region. In other words, the reward of EU membership is tangible for those willing to implement Union standards; until then, progress in complying with conditionality requirements will continue to be evaluated on individual country performances. However, due to weak state capacities and still looming soft-security challenges of the countries in the region, problems that are augmented by the EU's primary focus on the Eurozone crisis and other internal issues, there remains the danger that Croatia may be the last country to enter the EU until the end of the decade, or even longer. Therefore, the EU must search for a new strategic approach to keep the momentum of the accession process. Slowing down the process of EU accession might negatively impact the EU "transformative power" to stabilise the region and encourage regional countries to continue in implementation of reforms. The EU should search for answers on how to motivate the SEE countries to continue their reforms despite the fact that their EU membership may be far off in the future.

In these complex circumstances it is not surprising that there is substantial pressure on the EEAS "to perform" and contribute to bringing forth more unified EU positions that would aid in resolving the region's more troubling issues such as the status of Kosovo, name dispute in Macedonia, post-Dayton perspectives of Bosnia and Herzegovina and continuation of democratic development in Serbia. Further, on the operational level it is often noted that the EEAS must develop its capacities away from crisis management and toward crisis prevention as a means to induce more significant changes in the region.

Despite high expectations, which for the most part have yet to come to fruition, the EEAS may still be considered a positive tool in terms of bringing about a more coherent EU policy for South East Europe. The CSDP missions in the region such as the EULEX in Kosovo could also benefit from increased political leadership of the EU provided through innovative role of the EEAS. Kosovo represents a sound case in point. Despite Kosovo's still unresolved political issues, the EU has managed to impact progress 'on the ground' by facilitating dialogue between Belgrade and Pristine. On the other hand, the EU and EEAS have been less successful in facilitating agreements between the conflicting parties in Macedonia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina; however, the potential for such action is there and should not be underestimated.

As an end note, the city of Dubrovnik was specifically chosen for this workshop because of the historic significance of Dubrovnik Republic for the development of modern diplomacy.

IRMO Workshop co-Convenors:

Višnja Samardžija, P.hD.

Hrvoje Butković, P.hD.

Workshop Report

Introduction

The Institute for Development and International Relations (IRMO) organized the workshop *Relevance of the European External Action Service for the EU's policies towards South East Europe* as part of its partnership with the LISBOAN Project. LISBOAN (“Linking Interdisciplinary Integration Studies by Broadening the European Academic Network”) is an Erasmus Academic Network that aims to inspire scholarly knowledge and research of the Lisbon Treaty. The workshop was held on October 5, 2012 at the Inter-University Centre (IUC), Dubrovnik. Additional support was provided by Hanns Seidel Stiftung and from the Croatian Ministry of Science, Education, and Sports. In gathering researchers, experts, and decision-makers from the EU and South East Europe, the workshop produced a lively and shared discourse on the impact of the Lisbon Treaty, particularly in light of the changes in EU policies towards South East Europe.

Welcoming speeches were given by Dr. Višnja Samardžija of IRMO, and the University of Cologne’s Professor Wolfgang Wessels, the coordinator of the LISBOAN project. Dr. Samardžija described the EEAS as a novel system, which unfortunately is undermined by a number of ‘functional’ problems. She argued that it will take some time until its capacities will be fully operational. Nevertheless, the EEAS programme clearly aims to enhance the EU’s coherence and consistency as an actor at both the regional and global levels. Namely, the integration of complimenting EU policies should amplify the Union’s political clout and overall posture in international affairs. Additionally, Dr. Samardžija elaborated on the primary motivation behind the workshop: to analyze the EEAS’s impact in South East Europe (SEE), and specifically examine the effects EEAS has had on the interdependence between enlargement and the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Further, the workshop intended to unveil the potential effects of the EEAS on the processes of peace and state-building in the region, on the EU’s positions regarding the region’s most pressing issues (e.g., Kosovo), and on the relationship between the Union and Member States’ diplomatic endeavours. As a closing note, Samardžija remarked that IRMO selected the city of Dubrovnik because of its famous and historic democratic tradition, whereby an astute diplomatic network played a crucial role in securing independence and prosperity for the Dubrovnik Republic for more than four-hundred years.

Professor Wessels provided important background on the LISBOAN project, specifically its aim to energize cooperation between academic networks and policymakers. In bringing together top-level policymakers, both at the national and EU levels, the EEAS workshop underscored the nature of the Service’s mission. Professor Wessels reminded the audience that the starting point of European Political Cooperation (EPC) in foreign policy began at the 1969 Hague Conference, which subsequently became a stepping stone for the development of EU foreign policy. He argued that for over forty years the EU had been a tremendous success, and that EEAS represented a final stage in this process because it essentially represented a “new constellation, a true European-level diplomatic service”. Such arguments mark a distinction between the development of the EEAS and the advancement of CFSP developments in the 1990s and 2000s, with the latter emanating a specific EU flavour. However, Wessels conceded that EEAS-related

legislative provisions are still very intergovernmental; therefore, the EEAS's performance on the ground remains key to its credibility. In the end, it is purely a matter of “wait and see” in terms of how the previous institutional wrangling is settled with regard to EU foreign policy.

Keynote Speech

The Keynote speech, “Perspectives of the Lisbon Treaty's EEAS in the Western Balkans”, was delivered by Mr. Jonas Jonsson, Head of the Western Balkans Division at the EEAS. Mr. Jonsson stated that the EEAS should be viewed as part of the EU's wider and long-term strategic objectives to forge a common EU foreign policy and position itself within the global political landscape. Therefore, the EEAS essentially embodies a paradigm shift, whereby the Member States are restrained from pursuing an individual and separate foreign policy that fails to consider the values, objectives, and interests present at the supranational level. When addressing EU engagement in the SEE, he reflected upon a heightened scope of challenges before the Union, especially when compared to Central and Eastern European (CEE) states. According to Mr. Jonsson, the overall challenge is state-building, particularly as it represents an integral part of the guiding aim of integration. In this regard, the wording of the Stabilization and Accession Process (SAP) reflected the EU's mission to (first) stabilize and then integrate these countries. Later, Mr. Jonsson assessed the unique situations of the individual SEE countries. Despite marginal progress, the region is still witness to disturbing statements from places like Banja Luka, and occasional incidents in Kosovo and Macedonia. As of March 2011, the European Council has brought forth new conclusions with regard to Bosnia and Herzegovina; namely, they seek to further uphold local ownership and the sustainability of conditionality-related reforms. The EU has endorsed the use of reform incentives and a toolbox of multilevel instruments, as illustrated by the launch of the EU-Bosnia Structured Dialogue on Justice.

Turning to Serbia-Kosovo relations, Jonsson noted that the EU has played a positive role in the normalization of national ties, especially because both countries share the objective of eventual EU accession. Here, it should be noted, the EEAS is bringing added value to these processes. First, the EEAS participates in the role of policy-maker and agenda-setter, a responsibility shared between the EEAS, the European Commission (EC), and the Member States, and in particular the country that holds the rotating Council presidency. Second, the EEAS has an important presence within EU delegations, and as well, the two regional EU Special Representatives (EUSRs) are financed under the CFSP/Council budget. As a final comment on the EU's engagement in the region, Mr. Jonsson summarized that there remains no clear-cut demarcation between the EU's enlargement policy and the CFSP because the EU has yet to develop measures for the specific set of problems in the region. He argued that this tailor-made EU approach in the SEE required careful analysis because the EU is represented in the region at different levels: the EEAS, the EC, and the Member States. This state of affairs mirrors the depiction that the EU is an overlapping power. Accordingly, the essential goal of the EEAS is to secure coherence and consistency between the various EU voices and streamline the Union's endeavours into a sustainable and efficient framework. He believed that the EEAS could serve as a driving force behind this process, provided that the EC and Member States were willing to integrate efforts and resources through appropriate inter-institutional coordination.

During the subsequent discussion, workshop attendees raised a number of important questions. Many referred to the current-state of Serbia-Kosovo relations and the important steps that must be taken by political leaders in Belgrade and Pristina. For example, the discussion highlighted that there are a number of legal opportunities Serbia could utilize in order to improve its ties with Kosovo, which do not include formal recognition of Kosovo's independence, e.g., visa liberalization. Additionally, the debate shed light on the necessity for further reform efforts in the SEE region and the use of positive momentum created by Croatia's forthcoming accession to the EU in 2013.

Panel One

Panel One, chaired by Professor Wolfgang Wessels, was devoted to EEAS and the visibility of EU foreign policy in the Western Balkans. Mr. Wolfgang Koeth, a representative of the European Institute of Public Administration (EIPA), Maastricht, delivered a presentation on the institutional aspects of the EEAS on EU–Western Balkans relations. His primary question concerned whether the EEAS streamlined EU policies or represented an additional level of complexity. Later, he analyzed the inter-institutional relations between the EEAS and the European Commission's staff in EU Delegations, stressing that the EEAS had indeed advanced the EU's external visibility and horizontal coherence between the EU institutions. However, this has brought little change to the balance of power between the EC and the Member States, with the latter still firmly in control of the EU's foreign policy-making. In particular, relations between the EC and the Member State capitals are the most important variable in determining the outcome of the EU's foreign and enlargement policy because political decisions are (still) made within the borders of the Member States, rather than in Brussels. In this regard, he concluded that the EEAS has not been able to prevent a “creeping nationalization of EU enlargement policy”.

The second presentation was conducted by Dr. Tanja Tamminen of the Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA), Helsinki. She assessed EU crisis management efforts in the Western Balkans, which she described as a “laboratory” for the development of Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions. Mrs. Tamminen indicated that the EU has adopted a comprehensive crisis management approach, involving a variety of instruments from the EU's toolbox, with emphasis given to the concept of the human security doctrine. Through this involvement, the EU has acquired specific “know-how” about the Western Balkans region, transformed ethnic conflicts, and promoted reconciliation among the various parties, which represents a significant legacy for the development of EEAS's endeavours. Mrs. Tamminen also elaborated on the “lessons learned” from these missions and their importance in terms of future EU crisis management planning. She claimed that the EU needs to improve its current CSDP evaluation framework, and establish clear benchmarks in order to better assess the performance and impact of its missions. More generally, the EU must upgrade its early warning system, improve conflict and stakeholder analysis, enshrine a regionally-led focus, and support processes of inclusive country-led and country-owned transitions of conflicts, where including local stakeholders ensures more long-term sustainability. According to Mrs. Tamminen, the EEAS represents a valuable contribution to these efforts because it could serve to better integrate EU crisis management within the EU's political component.

Dr. Michele Comelli from the Istituto di Affari Internazionali (IAI), Rome, concluded the first panel by analyzing horizontal and vertical coherence within EU foreign policy, and its impact in the Western Balkans. In his view, vertical coherence between the EU and Member States is significantly more important than horizontal coherence between EU institutions, largely because the former's relations decisively shape the EU's policy towards the region. He argued that this has been clearly visible in the EU's policy towards Kosovo, where five Member States have yet to recognize its independence. This is obvious confirmation that the EU's foreign and enlargement policy are predominantly shaped by intergovernmental Member State preferences. However, he considered that regardless of the disunity within EU foreign policy, the Lisbon Treaty and the EEAS in particular have increased horizontal coherence. More specifically, the EU's inter-institutional dialogue has enhanced on issues like enlargement and the European Neighbourhood Policy, both of which have upgraded the level of trust amongst Member States on the EU's role in international affairs.

Panel Two:

Chaired by Mrs. Višnja Samardžija, Panel Two dealt with EEAS and its linkages to the processes of enlargement in the Western Balkans. Mrs. Ines Troha Brdar of the Croatian Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs opened the panel, focusing on the real impact of EEAS in the region. She emphasized that the inter-linkage between the EEAS and the EC in the individual countries of the Western Balkans were not only part of the EU's enlargement policy, but also subject to the CFSP and CSDP, given the ongoing missions in the region. Mrs. Troha Brdar argued that the Western Balkans are not discussed often enough within the framework of political debates conducted by the EU's Foreign Affairs Council (FAC), or even within informal meetings of the Foreign Affairs Ministers (Gymnich), despite ongoing and worrying political developments in certain countries. In terms of policy, she offered that the EEAS should be more open to the initiatives of those Member States who wished for more political dialogue, rather than reducing the EC's presence in the region to technical "carrot & stick" exercises. Apart from the high level dialogue taking place between Belgrade and Pristina under the auspices of EEAS, she argued that the last important high level event had been the Western Balkans Sarajevo conference in June 2010. She suggested that the EU should reinvigorate its clear political message towards the region and maintain the "enlargement spirit", despite the current economic crisis. Croatia, as a future Member State, is determined to keep the region at the very top of its foreign policy agenda. In terms of the benefits the EEAS would bring to Croatia and other aspiring EU countries in the region, she noted that these primarily concern improved access to information; this is of particular concern for areas outside of Europe, where most of the Western Balkan countries are poorly represented. She highlighted that Croatian diplomats would soon have the opportunity to work for the EEAS, either at its Brussels headquarters or within EU Delegations operating globally, enabling them invaluable work and life experiences.

Professor Attila Eralp and Dr. Zerrin Torun from the METU (Middle East Technical University), Ankara, focused on EU-Turkey relations in light of the Lisbon Treaty. Professor Eralp commented on the current impasse of relations given that no new negotiation chapters have been opened during the last several EU presidencies. Further, most of the opened chapters remain blocked because of the dispute with Cyprus. Turkish leaders credit this to a lack of political will

on both sides to move the process beyond deadlock, a fact which has diminished the level of trust in the EU among Turkish citizens. In the end, the EU enlargement process is losing its attractiveness in many parts of Turkey. On an optimistic note, Eralp noted several positive signals of improved EU-Turkey cooperation, including the creation of eight working groups focusing on the politically blocked chapters. Further positive steps have been made in the realm of energy issues and visa liberalization, where the readmission agreement has been negotiated and only awaits ratification. Professor Eralp emphasized that the visa issue was critical for the Turkish public; a positive outcome of this issue could very likely present a dramatic turn in EU-Turkey relations. Finally, he underlined that Turkey and the EU had begun to cooperate on foreign policy issues in the launching of a foreign policy dialogue. Although this dialogue has not been held at regular intervals and has yet to lead to any action in the form of common projects, he believed that it demonstrated a raised awareness among both parties about the necessity to intensify foreign policy cooperation, especially in light of the challenges brought about by the Arab Spring.

Contributing to the discussion, Mrs. Torun emphasized the EU's lack of a strategic vision when dealing with Turkey because both the Member States and EU institutions were competing amongst themselves over the correct strategic policy course for Turkey. She claimed that EU-Turkey relations should also be analyzed from the perspective of segmental integration, whereby Turkey could partially integrate itself into specific EU policy realms.

Panel Three:

Panel Three focused on views emanating from the region on the role of the EEAS. Professor Jovan Teokarević from the Faculty of Political Science, Belgrade analyzed the EEAS's involvement in Kosovo. He claimed that the EU's Kosovo policy was an example of both the Union's strength and weakness. On the EU's limitations, he noted that five Member States have not recognized Kosovo, which has subsequently derailed both the consistency and coordination of EU policy in the region. More positively, he noted that the EU is still in the process of expanding its Kosovo policy and has been active, ambitious, and successful in implementing it. Professor Teokarević stressed that the EU has successfully engaged both sides in the Belgrade-Pristina negotiations, proving that the EU can be an influential mediator under specific conditions. He indicated that these negotiations have allowed the EEAS a functional autonomy within the EU and the European Council, despite the problems associated with inter-institutional coordination stemming from the complexity of the EU's engagement in Kosovo.

Representing IRMO, Dr. Senada Šelo Šabić's presentation focused on power-sharing issues between the EUSR and OHR in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In particular, the Office of the High Representative (OHR) has been the driving force behind the implementation of the Dayton Peace Accord (DPA) and the construction of a democratic state. However, she noted that the OHR has been accused of seeding dependency among locals and of being a poor coordinator between the various international actors. She concluded that the OHR should be closed and that the EU Special Representative (EUSR) should assume the aforementioned state-building responsibilities. However, as the OHR is still operational, she argued that there has been a permanent institutional wrangling between these two institutions, which has further complicated an already difficult situation. Further, since 2006 a number of failed constitutional reform efforts have put the entire

peace process on hold as the country continues to struggle with both the shape and body of the EU accession process within the institutional framework of the Dayton Peace Accords.

Panel Three concluded with a presentation by Mr. Momčilo Radulović, President of the European Movement in Montenegro, Podgorica on the role of civil society organizations (CSOs) and their relations to the governments and EU institutions active in the Western Balkans. He noted that civil society actors have increasingly been considered by the governments as valuable partners, but that the level of their involvement in the policy-making processes remains uneven (depending on the country). As such, he called for more secure, structured, and systemic cooperation between the CSOs and the respective governments in the region in order to obtain a higher degree of involvement among the CSOs in domestic policy-making processes. Mr. Radulović suggested several new forms of cooperation, including expert-level consultations between EU institutions and local CSOs, which would significantly bolster the latter's capacities. Additionally, the CSOs must be better integrated into the IPA programmes.

Conclusions

In the concluding panel, Professor Wolfgang Wessels, Dr. Višnja Samardžija, and Dr. Hrvoje Butković stressed that the EEAS's launching remits positive ramifications for EU policies towards the Western Balkans, having already influenced the EU's inter-institutional cooperation positively. However, the real effects of the EEAS will not be fully discernible in the short-term, as it needs time to build and develop fully its capabilities so that it can foster successful cooperation with other EU actors. The ultimate goal is to create a common EU diplomatic culture and forge true cooperation between the EEAS, EU institutions, and Member States in order to fully utilize the EU's normative, political, and economic clout in issues related to foreign policy. The Western Balkans, long heralded as the EU's 'backyard', represents a sufficient laboratory for building a more unified EU policy. Finally, even the EU's engagement in Kosovo, despite its shortcomings and inconsistencies, has made progress on the ground and represent a sound basis for future EEAS endeavours.

Each workshop session fostered stimulating and convivial debates, whereby different opinions, arguments, and comments were invited and examined. At the close of the day, participants concluded that the current economic crisis has negatively affected the course of EU enlargement policy in the region; however, the full accession of South East European states in the EU remains the only viable, sustainable, and long-term option towards the goal of permanent political and economic stabilization.

Saša Čvrljak

(<http://www.irmo.hr/node/1652>)

Abstracts of the Panel Contributions

Streamlining of policies or additional level of complexity? The impact of the EEAS on EU - Western Balkans relations

Wolfgang Koeth

Senior Lecturer European Institute of Public Administration - EIPA, Maastricht

w.koeth@eipa.eu

Introduction

With the Lisbon Treaty's entering into force in December 2009, a new area in EU external relations has dawned. The creation of the EU High Representative position, which doubles as a Vice President of the European Commission, and of the European External Action Service, unveils the EU's intention to overcome the decades-old schisms between the Community-driven set of external policies (development, trade, enlargement, humanitarian assistance) and the Member State controlled CFSP/CSDP. In sum, ample evidence suggests a growing awareness among Member States that the lack of coherence between its policies and institutions inhibits its self-declared role as a global player and normative power, one that is able to promote European norms and values around the world.

The Western Balkans is but one particular region where the EU's lack of a coordinated strategy has prevented a successful outcome. Unable to speak with one voice in the 1990s, the EU was relegated to the conflict's sidelines, as war in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo unfolded. In fact, the EU twice witnessed its own irrelevance as US-led NATO troops abruptly ended civilian massacres and ethnic cleansing campaigns in both Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo.

Throughout the 1990s, it was not the EU which had shaped the Western Balkans, but rather the Western Balkans which had shaped the EU. Both the reluctant establishment of the Common Foreign and Security Policy in 1992 and the European Security and Defence Policy in 1999 were direct consequences of the EC/EU's failure to perpetrate a constructive role during the Yugoslavian conflicts. The creation of the ESDP (now CSDP) in 1999 briefly nourished hopes that the EU would finally pass from words to actions. Yet rather than enhancing the visibility of the EU in the Balkans, CSDP has added another layer of complexity. The pre-Lisbon involvement of the EU in Kosovo serves as a puzzling illustration: as many as seven different EU-led missions were speaking simultaneously on behalf of the Union in Kosovo, and the 27 Member States still today disagree on whether this area of 11,000 square-kilometres is to be recognized as an independent state or a Serbian province under UN administration; this despite the fact that Kosovo has enjoyed the status of a "potential candidate" for EU accession since 2003.

Historically, coordination between the Commission-driven enlargement agenda and the Council-driven CFSP/CSDP has been minimal. Each of these institutions has long adhered to their own structures, objectives, and chains of command. As such, the current question for debate is whether the Lisbon Treaty and the EEAS have been able to address these inconsistencies.

The EEAS: Consolidating the EU's external relations (except enlargement)

The Lisbon Treaty itself provides little guidance on the form, design, and responsibilities of the EEAS. Moreover, the July 2010 Council Decision does not confer any competences to the new diplomatic service with respect to EU enlargement. As well, unlike other financial instruments, namely the Instrument for Pre-Accession (IPA), the EU's main tool in supporting the (potential) candidates on their way towards EU integration, is not mentioned in the EEAS decision. Given that enlargement dominates EU-Western Balkan relations, many wonder whether the EEAS will be of any relevance for the countries in this region.

Here, an obvious division must be made between "candidate countries", where the relations with the EU are overwhelmingly dominated by the enlargement agenda (an exclusive domain of the European Commission), and the "potential candidates", e.g., Bosnia and Kosovo, which both host a CSDP mission, and the Head of Delegation also coordinates the EUSR (all three are, at least nominally, under the EEAS). As the role of the EEAS (other than its nominal head of the Delegation position) could arguably be neglected in the candidate countries, the primary focus here is on Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo.

The EEAS: More coherence and consistency?

In order to assess the impact of the EEAS in Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina, it is imperative to observe the local impact of the two major objectives behind the EEAS's establishment: (i) to improve coherence and consistency of the different EU actors and (ii) to promote the increased visibility of the EU as a foreign policy actor.

Coherence between Enlargement and CSDP

Upon its establishment, the EEAS has inherited the responsibilities of the two remaining CSDP Missions in the Western Balkans: EUFOR Althea in Bosnia (military); and EULEX Kosovo (civilian). In this context, the relations between the different EU actors (i.e., the Commission and the EULEX mission, the latter structurally under the EEAS) is of particular interest, as both have a common objective in Kosovo to build rule of law capacities. For the Commission, this is part of its effort to guide Kosovo towards compliance of the Copenhagen Criteria, a precondition for EU accession. For this effort, the Commission utilizes its traditional enlargement methodology based on local ownership and voluntary compliance with European norms and standards (a bottom-up approach); whereas EULEX, as a CSDP mission, forges a security perspective, focussing on results rather than the process, and using, among other tools, its executive powers to achieve this result (a top-down approach). This is problematic in so far as imposing rule of law from above bears the risk of weakening the ownership of local authorities. In other words, there is little incentive for local politicians to implement painful reforms in order to deliver a result, if the same can be delivered by EULEX without domestic political cost.

Coherence and consistency within the EEAS

Even a cursory glance at the EEAS reveals that the CSDP bodies in charge of planning and implementing its operations, as well as the EUSR, are on the sidelines of the service's organigramme, which itself is modelled on the former DG Relex. Instead, there is a direct

reporting line to the HR, which bypasses the regular EEAS bureaucracy (country and thematic desks; the Corporate and Policy Board). It can be assumed that such a setup was lobbied for by (some) Member States that did not want any supranational elements originating from the former DG Relex/DG Development to be involved in the planning and implementation of the Common Security and Defence Policy.

In terms of security, some of the crisis management-related bodies of the EEAS (the CMPD or the Military Staff) have yet to relocate to the new EEAS Headquarters on Rond Point Schuman in Brussels. Even if this may just be a technicality, it nevertheless reflects that these bodies are hardly affected by the organisational reforms brought about by the EEAS as they seem to continue a “business as usual” approach. To date, the new “esprit de corps” of the EEAS, often quoted as indispensable for the functioning of the new service, hardly exists in reality, at least with regard to the crisis-management bodies that were officially transferred from the Council to the EEAS in 2011.

Coherence and consistency within the EU Delegations

The 2010 Council Decision establishing the EEAS puts the EU Delegation under the authority of a Head of Delegation appointed by the High Representative. The Delegations are therefore structurally under the EEAS. However, as enlargement remains the dominant agenda for relations between Western Balkans countries and the EU, and as the competence for enlargement remains with the Commission, it is natural that a large majority (approximately 80%) of Delegation staffs come directly from the Commission. However, as the Head of Delegation exerts authority over each of the Delegation staffs, one could easily imagine situations where employees receive different tasks and guidelines from the two sides. Whereas a coordination unit in Brussels has been created and Inter-Service agreements signed, the viability of these arrangements needs further assessment.

Increased visibility?

Though the increase in coherence and consistency of the Lisbon Treaty might not be obvious, it nevertheless has a positive impact on the external visibility of the EU in the countries of the Western Balkans. Namely, it has reduced the number of representatives speaking (often uncoordinatedly) on behalf of the EU. As noted above, the EUSR in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo now wears “two hats” as Head of Delegation (or EU office, in the case of Kosovo). In addition, the Lisbon Treaty no longer provides for the six-month rotating presidency to represent the EU (as opposed to the EC) in non-member countries. For the Western Balkans, this means that the ambassador of the country holding the EU presidency no longer speaks “on behalf of the EU” abroad, thus casting a shadow on the Head of Delegation. This role has been assigned to the Head of Delegation, who is entitled to speak on all EU relevant matters (including, in principle, the CFSP). For the EU, having a common interface with local partners gives an important boost to the Union’s visibility and credibility.

Conclusion

As the countries of the Western Balkans no longer endanger regional or European instability, the *raison d'être* for the remaining two CSDP missions in Kosovo in Bosnia and Herzegovina has mitigated; their days are certainly numbered. On the other hand, and despite the diminished image of the EU in the wake of the still looming economic crisis, enlargement will continue to hold a prominent position within the political agenda of the Western Balkan countries. With enlargement, at least politically and institutionally, remaining under the auspices of the Commission, the EEAS's role is limited in principle to administrative support linked to the functioning of the Delegations. However, this may bear some political impact: the Head of Delegation might be, in theory, a diplomat from a Member State with a bilateral political agenda (and a lack of supranational thinking). Further, there remains the risk that bilateral national agendas might increasingly interfere with the Commission's enlargement agenda via the Delegations. The Commission must be vigilant to avoid a "hijacking" by the Delegations and prepared to defend its interests.

Impact of the EU crisis management efforts in the Western Balkans

Tanja Tamminen, PhD

Finnish Institute of International Affairs

tanja.tamminen@fii.fi

Introduction

Heightened expectations permeate the current and future impact of the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy. At the same time, the added value, efficiency, and effectiveness of EU policies and CSDP missions are under closer scrutiny due to the economic crisis. Member States and their parliaments are requesting more complete analyses on the impact of crisis management efforts, operations, and most of all, costs. The current line of thinking is: What do we actually get for our money? Each conflict is unique and requires a tailored response. Indeed, the EU needs more coherent policies as well as tools and capacities to monitor and assess its initiatives and their impact in conflict areas. In the Western Balkans, the EU's crisis management activities have a tangible track record. As such, the following proposes to analyze current EU efforts as a means to assess the 'lessons learned' in the Balkans and create tools for measuring successes and failures. In particular, this contribution focuses on the role of the EEAS in coordinating comprehensive EU policies towards the region (including crisis management, enlargement policies, and IPA assistance) so as to draw on lessons from past activities.

The Lisbon Treaty

After a year of violent conflict, the civil war in Syria shows no sign of abating. The non-action, ineptitude, and disunity of the international community has been strongly criticized by scholars and policymakers alike, who over the recent past have hailed the paradigms of *human security* and *responsibility to protect*, and in the process emphasised the moral duty of the international community to curb violence and protect human lives. The inability to act efficiently, prevent such violent crisis from escalating, and launch settlement negotiations have tragically shown the limits of the international community's conflict prevention and conflict management policies.

Bearing the heavy burden of severe economic crisis, the European Union has not been able to make a difference, even though the 2009 Lisbon Treaty created structures to coalesce the various intergovernmental mechanisms into a more coherent foreign policy. The Treaty established the European External Action Service (EEAS) and created the position of a permanent President of the European Council, who now represents the EU abroad (Herman van Rompuy). Catherine Ashton, the Union's High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, directs the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy, and leads the EEAS, and simultaneously serves as a Vice President of the Commission. This new structure was intended to overcome the tradition of incoherency, a permeating characteristic of all the EU's foreign policy institutions and strategies. In sum, the Union is finally capable of speaking with one voice to condemn the violence in Syria; however, questions remains as to whether these new structures have enabled the EU to be a stronger actor in the field of conflict prevention and peace building.

Given the EU's long track record of crisis management and peace building initiatives in the Western Balkans, an analysis of these activities can help to elaborate on the future of the Union's foreign policy.

Comprehensive crisis management and strategic action

Since its inception, the EEAS has come under heavy criticism for its lack of strategic planning. High Representative Catherine Ashton has absorbed the brunt of criticism, and as such, has aimed to steer the Common Security and Foreign Policy towards more strategic thinking. She considers the main role of the EEAS to be conflict prevention. In the near future, the EU's crisis management missions will be evaluated on the basis of benchmarks, exit strategies, and end state logic, etc. Above all, an ear to the high political speeches and conclusions of the Council suggests that European crisis management operations must be more "coherent and efficient".

Yet the reality on the ground speaks to the current state of inconsistent management. The diversity of Member State reactions concerning the Libyan crisis illustrated the continuing lack of a united foreign policy line, particularly when it comes to military intervention. The inability to prevent the current civil war in Syria from escalating has solicited memories from the dark days of the early 1990s, when the EU was unable to curtail the atrocities in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Dutch UN peacekeepers standing by idly as genocide befell Srebrenica is among the worst disgraces in the history of the European Union; subsequent characterizations of the Union as a "political dwarf" were well-deserved.

In light of the aforementioned limitations, the EU created the European Security and Defence Policy in the aftermath of the Kosovo war in 1999. The Lisbon Treaty later reformed and renamed it the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). Optimistically, conceptualisations of peace building have come a long way since the early 1990s. The CSDP has bequeathed to the Union a full range of operational tools. It can intervene globally, with three separate CSDP operations alone launched in Africa in the summer 2012. In 2011 the Council agreed to strengthen its capabilities, adding mediation-directed tools to conflict prevention. However, the official 'company line' remains full of vague concepts, or rather that which is most agreeable to all Member States, including peace and stability, comprehensive action, cooperation, and coordination. The EEAS now faces the challenge of how to operationalise these concepts in order to actually improve its policy where it matters most, the ground campaign.

The definitions of comprehensive crisis management vary from a simple understanding of a need to promote synergies between civil and military actors to larger concepts underscoring the need for coordination and joint efforts between all actors in crisis areas, which includes development agencies. Most agree that the ideal situation would be to utilize the best tools in a comprehensive manner to achieve a certain objective – thus each actor has a specific role to play and there is neither overlapping nor gaps in the action.

However, idealism rarely works in a complex crisis situation, where either no one dares to intervene or a multitude of overlapping and inefficient international actors are in place. Until only recently, EU actors have not always been able to reach consensus on the ground on joint objectives and strategies. In places like Kosovo, the local political leaders have had trouble in

identifying EU policies, particularly when the EU Commission subcontracted work to private consultants. Moreover, CSDP operation monitors and the EUSR office often dispense conflicting advice on local legislation.

In principle, the Lisbon Treaty, the EEAS, and the strengthened role of EU delegations on the ground provide Member States the necessary tools to coordinate EU action in (potential/post-) crisis areas. The cooperation between the EEAS and the Commission could be overcome if there was the necessary will inside the respective institutions, and less rigid thinking in terms of mandates and jurisdiction of each institution (i.e., more pragmatism). The EU's delegations in Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina are both examples of 'improved' development, where the EUSR is also the Head of Delegation. In both countries, respect for the EUSR has strengthened since this reform. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the EUSR previously served simultaneously as the High Representative (heading the OHR), and in Kosovo the EUSR also held the position of the International Civilian Representative (heading the ICO).

When international representatives are respected and trusted by the local population, EU delegations can easier detect the necessary early warning signs, and therefore be more proactive in the field of peace building and conflict prevention. The main pragmatic objective of comprehensive crisis management thinking is to identify the most effective and tailor-made instruments to combat each crisis situation. In short, early action requires a holistic use of the tools at hand.

The Evaluation of European Commission Support to Conflict Prevention and Peace-building, (Final Report, October 2011; prepared by ADE) reveals that the Commission's role in providing financial support to conflict prevention and peace building should not be neglected. In addition, the Commission has intervened in conflict areas using both long-term development measures, as well as short-term instruments such as political dialogue, high level mediation, and the deployment of EU observers. Unfortunately, the report notes that there "was a gap between the Commission's policy commitment to an integrated approach for conflict prevention and peace building support and the actual implementation of this approach". Further, conceptual orientations at the policy level were not always shared at the strategic level, and the Commission's approach to conflict analysis, conflict sensitivity, and mainstreaming was not systematised.

The Commission did react quickly to conflicts but there were shortcomings in terms of the transition to long-term prevention. Where it regards coordination between different EU actors, the report indicates that the Commission took initiatives to enhance it at different levels, but this generally resulted in the enhanced exchange of information rather than a strengthening of complementarities. Indeed, one of the lessons learned was the need to avoid duplication and enhance synergies between EU actors at the strategy, programming, and implementation levels.

Since Lisbon's ratification, the coherence and effectiveness of the EU's approach requires further enhancement. Quite simply, the various EU institutions should work on the same goals, with shared strategies. Further, the impact of EU activities should be monitored and duly evaluated to learn from past mistakes and strive towards more effective action.

Looking for coherence in European foreign policy The European External Action Service and the Balkans

Michele Comelli, P.hD.

Senior Fellow, Istituto Affari Internazionali - IAI, Rome

m.comelli@iai.it

The history of European foreign policy is marked by an ongoing struggle to achieve coherence and consistency, both on a vertical/horizontal level and as well on a political and procedural level. The Western Balkans is presumably the region where such gaps have been felt the most. Conflict in the Balkans presented the necessary justification for the creation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), now known as the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), and as such fuelled many (and even excessive) expectations; Mr Poos's call for "the hour of Europe" comes to mind. In the aftermath of the Yugoslavian wars, the EU conceived a European future for the countries of the region, with emphasis given to the integration and coordination of all the instruments available within EU foreign policy, from enlargement and diplomatic dialogue, to civilian and military missions. However, Member State positions predictably varied on a number of topics of paramount importance, in particular the question of Kosovo recognition. The Lisbon Treaty's entry into force was supposed to enhance the efficiency and coherency of European foreign policy; however, the disappearance of the Three Pillars has not resulted in a unification of the legal and institutional procedures regulating the different strands of European foreign policy.

Prior to presenting an analysis on the aforementioned, it is worthwhile to define "coherence", a word which has become something of a mantra in the debate on EU foreign policy. First, it must be noted that coherence is often used synonymously with "consistency", even though the two terms have different meanings. While there is no general agreement on the exact differences between the two concepts, scholars have done their best to approximate a distinction. For example, according to Missiroli (2001) and Hillion (2008), while consistency involves the absence of contradictions, coherence involves also "positive connections", "synergies", and "added value" between several factors.

Generally, there are two dimensions to coherence (Gebhard, 2011): one strategic or policy related, and one technical or procedural. While the former addresses the need to avoid conflicting objectives or clashing political agendas, the latter refers to the administrative implications of the necessity to reconcile two different policy-making strands and their respective bureaucratic machineries. Further, coherence is usually divided vertically and horizontally. Vertical coherence refers to the convergence of Member State positions with regard to a specific issue or area; horizontal coherence relates to the concertation between the supranational and intergovernmental arms of the EU, the Commission and the Council, respectively. Ensuring both vertical and horizontal coherence has long been one of the most difficult challenges for European foreign policy.

European foreign policy towards the Western Balkans has traditionally suffered from insufficient coherence. At its inception, when war broke out in the former-Yugoslavia in the early 1990s,

Member States did not have a single coordinated policy. Notably, while Germany was from the very beginning, a strong advocate of independence for the states seceding from Yugoslavia, France favoured the status quo, i.e., keeping Yugoslavia in place. After the end of the wars in the Balkans, and particularly throughout the 2000s, Member States converged on the idea that the future of the region would unequivocally fall within the parameters of the EU. While there remains no consensus within the EU on whether to provide an enlargement perspective to former Soviet countries, such as the Ukraine or Moldova, all Member States support the end-goal of EU membership for all the Western Balkan countries. This is indeed a promising result if we consider how divided the positions of the Member States were in the early 1990s. Yet this does not necessarily entail that vertical coherence has been achieved with regard to EU foreign policy in the Balkans. Two factors account for this. First, there remains the important and outstanding issue on Kosovo independence. In fact, while most of the EU countries have recognised its independence, which was officially proclaimed on February 17, 2008, five Member States have refused to do so: Cyprus, Greece, Romania, Slovakia, and Spain. Second, there is no unanimity on how to implement conditionality towards the Western Balkans, particularly where it concerns labelling Balkan countries as “candidates” for accession. Here, the EU is often divided between “hawks” and “doves”; the former proclaiming a rigid approach to conditionality, the latter urging for more flexibility. Conditionality cleavages have often thwarted the creation of a common EU position. For example, in December 2011 the European Council was unable to overcome internal divisions on whether to grant Serbia the status of an “EU candidate”. It is worth noting that a common position was reached in March 2012.

In addition, horizontal coherence continues to be a problematic issue for the EU’s foreign policy in the Balkans. Indeed, there is no other region in the world where the EU has deployed the whole panoply of foreign policy/external relations instruments. As such, the region has been the theatre of both civilian and military missions. The EULEX mission in Kosovo and the EUFOR (military) mission in Bosnia Herzegovina continue their mandates, while the European Union Police Mission-EUPM in Bosnia Herzegovina was terminated at the end of June 2012. Diplomatic dialogue has also been widely used, a case in point being the launch of the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue in September 2010. In parallel, the EU has been involved in the enlargement process that, despite its shortcomings, has recently witnessed several positive developments: Croatia is expected to enter the EU in July 2013; Serbia was granted candidate status by the European Council; and Montenegro has recently opened accession negotiations with the EU. Enlargement and the whole array of its related programmes grouped into the Instrument for Pre-Accession (IPA) are managed by the European Commission. Traditionally, these two strands of European foreign policy have grown divergently, and developed apart from one another. Thus the key question is whether the creation of the European External Action Service (EEAS) has reversed this trend.

Indeed, one of the main aims of the EEAS was to make European foreign policy more effective and coherent. As such, it is imperative to assess the EEAS with regard to the EU’s policy towards the Western Balkans.

It is perhaps still too early to provide an accurate evaluation of the EEAS, since it became operational only in January 2011. However, we can already observe some emerging trends,

beginning with the issue of vertical coherence. Here, the positions of Member States with reference to a handful of “high politics” issues are still different. Differences over how to implement conditionality towards Balkan countries continue; the delay of the European Council’s decision to grant Serbia candidate status in December 2011 is but one example. Comparing the European Foreign Policy scorecards compiled by the European Council for Foreign Relations (ECFR) in 2010 and in 2012, we notice that the unity of Member States’ foreign policies towards the Balkans have not changed significantly (ECFR 2010; ECFR 2012). However, a closer examination reveals some positive developments. For example, Slovakia, one of the five countries that have not recognised Kosovo independence, has recently begun to accept Kosovar passports (Bechev, 2012). In addition, it is a former Slovakian Foreign Affairs Minister, Miroslav Lajcak, who now serves as a top official within the EEAS, managing relations with Eastern Europe and the Western Balkans. This sends a tough message to Serbia on the issue of conditionality. Yet whether this is already the result of the much anticipated socialisation effect, by which national diplomats serving in EU institutions and bodies take on a European perspective in their job, remains difficult to say.

In sum, the effects of vertical coherence usually take longer to realise, and the EEAS in its current form does not provide many instruments, except for the obligation to consult with national diplomacies, which is also extended to the EU Delegations who are in better touch with national representatives.

On the horizontal side, the EEAS provides an organisational merger of the lower levels of day-to-day administrative work with regard to EU external action, and therefore has much potential in terms of creating synergetic effects (Gebhard 2011). On the other hand, it should be noted that this is less true for the Western Balkans when compared to other areas. While, for example, the EU’s policy towards neighbouring countries is conceived and implemented inside the EEAS, EU policy towards the Balkans is very much divided between the foreign policy component (managed by the EEAS), and the enlargement component (controlled by the Commission). This is also reflected at the delegation level, where EEAS officials report to the Head of Delegation (HoD), while enlargement officials report directly to Commission headquarters in Brussels. This is a lamentable situation given that the Lisbon Treaty intended to remove such divisions (Interview 2012)².

Evaluating European foreign policy coherence towards the Western Balkan following the creation of the EEAS is a difficult task. Coherence is a multifaceted concept, and it is useful at least to differentiate between vertical and horizontal coherence. While it is too early to judge the impact of the EEAS on the coherence of EU policy towards the Balkans, some positions on Kosovo have converged, although in a limited fashion. It remains to be seen whether or not this was (also) triggered by the EEAS itself. On the horizontal side, much work is underway. However, in the Balkans, the divisions between competences have remained in place, with the Commission in

² Interview with a Head of Delegation in a western Balkan country, April 2012.

charge of enlargement and the EEAS responsible for political issues. On the ground, this is reflected at the level of EU delegations.

Bibliography

Bechev, D., The periphery of the periphery: the Western Balkans and the Euro crisis, *Policy Brief*, European Council for Foreign Relations, August 2012, available at: http://ecfr.eu/page/-/ECFR60_WESTERN_BALKANS_BRIEF_AW.pdf

Duke, S., The European External Action Service: antidote against incoherence?, *European Foreign Affairs Review*, 2012, No. 17, Issue. 1, pp. 45-68.

European Council on Foreign Relations, European foreign policy scorecard, 2012, available at: <http://www.ecfr.eu/scorecard/2012>

European Council on Foreign Relations, European foreign policy scorecard, 2010, available at: <http://www.ecfr.eu/scorecard/2010>

Gebhard, C., Coherence, in C. Hill and M. E. Smith, *International relations and the European Union*, Oxford, 2011.

Gross, E; Rotta, A. The EEAS and the Western Balkans, *IAI Working Paper* 11/15, June 2011, available at: <http://www.iai.it/pdf/DocIAI/iaiw1115.pdf>

Missiroli, A., European security policy: the challenge of coherence, *European Foreign Affairs Review*, 2001, No. 6, pp. 177-196.

European External Action Service and Western Balkans region
What has the new service brought to the region?

Ines Troha Brdar

Head of the CFSP Department

Ministry of European and Foreign Affairs, Republic of Croatia

ines.trohabrdar@mvep.hr

The mere fact that four decades have passed between the first modest and meagre attempts to create some sort of foreign policy coordination among EU Member States (European Political Cooperation EPC, from 1970, which primarily consisted of an exchange of information on foreign policy issues), and the moment of creating an informal ‘Common Foreign Ministry’ speaks volumes on the Member States’ reluctance to delegate the powers of leading, managing, and steering national foreign policies.

In the meantime, we have been witness to gradual and incremental developments, some directly provoked by events in South East Europe. The challenge, or rather the need to speak and act with “one voice,” became appallingly evident when the EU failed to address the political crisis and subsequent violent dissolution of the former-Yugoslavia.

Addressing the diffuseness of EU foreign policy, the Lisbon Treaty introduced major innovations, particularly where it concerns significant reforms in the areas of both CFSP and CSDP. However, it has been clear from the very beginning that the creation of an elaborated institutional framework will not necessarily, nor automatically, be a panacea to the growing number of challenges in the contemporary global arena.

The current political and economic subtext (global economic crisis; disruption in the euro zone; the Arab Spring) and the sheer scale of challenges necessitate a comprehensive approach, entailing strong and enhanced leadership, and a coherent and efficient response from the EU and the EEAS. It entails bringing substance and consistency to the foreign policy agenda, complemented by the use of a whole range of policy and operational instruments. Of course, this is merely the theoretical groundwork. In reality, the external dimension of EU relations with third countries remains divided between the Commission and the Council, now permanently presided over by the High Representative who is, at the same time, Vice President of the Commission. This institutionalized “double-hat” model has a direct impact on the countries of the Western Balkans. Further divisions ensue from the fact that the region is situated on the intersection of foreign and enlargement policies. Each of the respective countries is at a different stage of the integration process, and day-to-day business with Brussels is primarily administered at technical levels, or rather within the purview of the Commission. At the same time, each of the Western Balkan countries, with the exceptions of soon-to-be Member State Croatia, and Montenegro, which has recently commenced with the exhausting exercise of accession negotiations, are still EU foreign (and even defence) policy targets given the two ongoing EU missions in the region.

In a way, it would be a confirmation of positive developments if the Western Balkans region would disappear from the EEAS' radar as an "issue to deal with", and instead remain solely engaged with the Commission on technical areas. Regrettably, some countries in the region have not yet reached this stage. An analysis of the frequency of enlisting these countries on the monthly Foreign Affairs Council's agenda shows that there is a slight gap, not quite correlated with the fact that the region is in the EU's immediate neighbourhood and therefore, a potential crisis area. In other words, if issues are mishandled, they could easily become a palpable security risk to the Union. Consequently, the results of this analysis call for further attention. Bosnia and Herzegovina has been on the Council's agenda four separate times over the last two and half years. Every conclusion emanating from the discussions unreservedly support the country's territorial integrity, and stress the imperative of dealing with issues perceived as serious obstacles on the integration path. More accurately, however, Bosnia has appeared on the agenda largely because the EU needed to restructure its presence there and review its EUFOR Althea mission mandate. Notwithstanding the fact that some Member States attempted to push for a discussion on Bosnia and Herzegovina on the eve of the last Peace Implementation Council's meeting, the EEAS was very determined to avoid it. As well, Serbia appeared on the Foreign Affairs Council's agenda at the very last moment when some Member States felt there was a need to commence a political discussion before the General Affairs and (subsequently) the European Council decided on its candidate status. FYROM/Macedonia and Albania have curiously not been subjects of discussion for some time, despite the fact that they are seriously lagging behind in their integration processes.

Nevertheless, it should be noted that the lower levels of the EEAS are frequently addressing all of these countries. There are numerous discussions in the respective Working Groups, as well as in the PSC; however, the true leadership and political visibility of the Union are only achieved when higher political levels take the lead. Here, personal engagement and commitment play a crucial role. It is against this background that we should acknowledge the active involvement of the EEAS Special Counsellor Robert Cooper, who formerly led the Belgrade-Pristine talks, and has managed to open solutions that made it possible for Serbia to obtain its candidacy status. On the same note, messages from Brussels concerning the future High Representative's personal engagement in the High-level Dialogue between Belgrade and Pristine should also be welcomed. However, the impression remains that the EEAS should be more open to the repeated initiatives of some countries in the wider neighbourhood, who would appreciate their regional concerns to be featured on the Council's agenda more frequently.

At the same time, there is a clear need for the countries in the region to receive the unequivocal support of the EU for their membership aspirations; at the minimum, it would be enough to feel that their issues are represented on the EU's agenda. It should be reiterated that the prospect of enlargement in the Western Balkans represents a key policy tool for the EU, a fact which differentiates the region from others in terms of the EU's overall foreign policy strategy. However, it seems as if the pull of EU membership has mitigated over time. As such, the shift in the presidency of the Foreign Affairs Council, and consequently in the informal ministerial meeting known as Gymnich, has also brought about a negative change from the region's vantage point. Following the 2003 European Council and Thessaloniki Agenda, which foresaw different means to enhance cooperation with the Western Balkans and the SAP countries, this practice

implied that at the margins of the Gymnich meetings a certain amount of time would be dedicated to the Western Balkans countries. At the same time, it reassured these countries that they do matter regardless of the fact that their integration processes were moving at a significantly slower pace than in the previous rounds of enlargement. Further, it allowed them a chance to report on developments in their respective countries. Although representatives of Western Balkan countries were still allowed to participate at the working breakfast and lunch sessions during the second day of Gymnich, the issues discussed no longer related solely to the region. Instead, they centred on other pressing international issues, primarily the developments in the Southern Neighbourhood. Although the High Representative has made several visits to the region, the Commission has been decidedly more active and innovative when promoting new mechanisms and approaches in the region (i.e. high level dialogues, pre-screenings, a feasibility study with Kosovo, etc). On the other hand, the High Representative is also a Vice President of the Commission and therefore at least partially responsible for the initiatives taken by the Commission. However, there remains a fundamental difference in how issues are approached in the region, depending on when the Commission, as an executive EU body, has the lead and when the Council acts with the consent of all the Member States.

In conclusion, the challenge for the EEAS and the Western Balkans is twofold and frankly depends on leadership and coherence. The state-of-play demonstrates that it is a story of mixed outcomes and effects on one hand, and unfulfilled potential and added value on the other. For the EU, it is of utmost importance to maintain positive momentum by resolving the current stalemates through results-oriented decision-making by the EEAS, and the smart and efficient coordination of various political and operational instruments and commitments. For the Western Balkan countries, there is a whole set of advantages envisaged in the long-term, particularly once the obstacle of membership is removed. On a practical note, these are relatively small countries with seriously limited administrative capacities and poorly developed diplomatic networks. The ability to rely on the services of the EEAS in an African or Latin American country surely represents a significant relief. Moreover, the service extends well beyond the sharing of information and the holding of regular EU coordination meetings. The EEAS has launched a whole set of projects currently being devised and discussed among secretary generals in the Member States' Ministries of Foreign Affairs. These projects embrace the ideas of shared premises, common public procurement, the provision of consular services for all EU citizens, and the sharing of information inside a common network.

Remaining challenges in the Western Balkans

Valentin Petroussenko, Ph.D.

Jean Monnet Senior Lecturer at Plovdiv University

petrus@uni-plovdiv.bg

In light of the final and decisive stage of Croatia's EU accession process, enlargement negotiations continue to represent an important stabilizing factor for the countries in the Western Balkans. However, two dramatic diplomatic and political impasses remain. To date, negotiations on these issues have been futile and seemingly headed to nowhere. In fact, at this point any solution would be welcomed.

The first issue concerns Kosovo independence and its dispute with Serbia, which vehemently rejects any proposed formula that entails eventual recognition of Kosovo. The second issue is the ongoing quarrels between Macedonia (FYROM) and its neighbours (mainly Greece, but also its diplomatic tension with Bulgaria throughout most of its twenty-two years of independence).

It is clear that the situation within the EU does not favour any new steps towards enlargement, which for more than a decade has been a leading objective for the Union. Although when enlargement was at its beginning stages, Brussels knew that the process would inappropriately overlap with the delicately planned measures for structural reconstruction of the European Community. Each of the subsequent "deepening" steps of the European Union, including the dead-end project for a European Constitution, were executed under the pressure of imminent complications from EU management and the incoming Member States. The set of structural reforms initiated was further under the pressure of enlargement policies.

All these past challenges illustrate the achievement of Croatia's successful bid to accede to the Union. However, they also bring to light growing concerns and scepticism among older EU Member States with regard to enlargement to other Western Balkan countries, which can be seen in both Bulgaria and Romania's Schengen application processes.

Returning to the diplomatic and political impasse of Kosovo and Macedonia, the former has garnered more EU visibility since the introduction of EULEX instruments intended to stabilize policies in the region. Still, ongoing conflicts, usually in the form of Serbian-Kosovar confrontations, reveal the limited range of EULEX in the mediation between the two parties.

The case of Macedonia/FYROM is perhaps more complicated given the heightened state of its neighbourhood confrontations. While the name dispute with Greece seems to be a hopeless situation over the coming years, Greece's veto stymies any preliminary steps towards initiating the EU membership negotiations process. In this sense, Brussels has succumbed to the pressure of (old) Member State Greece, and failed to find any flexibility on the Macedonian topic. Further, the European External Action Service has provided no real propositions in reaching a cooperative political dialogue.

Further complicating matters, Skopje continues to provoke its neighbours vis-à-vis the glorification of its historic legacy, e.g., naming its national airport after Alexander the Great, which openly irritates Greek nationalists. The recently launched mega-construction programme titled “Skopje 2014” aims to glorify certain elements of its common Balkan historical legacy into one single manifestation of Macedonia’s place in history. Obviously, this causes irritation not only for Greece, but as well for Bulgaria. Leaders in Sofia recently managed to block and rename the planned Macedonian exhibition of medieval texts in Brussels on the grounds that they were falsified. Following this, EU commissioner Stefan Fühle (for the first time) warned Skopje that it would be held responsible for constantly provoking its neighbouring countries. As a result, difficulties in managing an overall EU regional policy persist given that Macedonia continues to unhinge positive steps towards a better climate of cohabitation and the successful negotiation of its much-desired EU membership.

Despite the good example and stable framework offered by Croatia’s EU accession process, a number of regional challenges remain unsolved. The Lisbon Treaty offers several new approaches to possible solutions, which may give way to the involvement of both political elites and emerging civil societies in the Western Balkans into a process of balanced dialogue and good neighbourly relations.

Re-visiting Turkey-EU relations in light of the Lisbon Treaty

Prof. Atila Eralp

Chair of the Center for European Studies

METU, Ankara

eralp@ces.metu.edu.tr

Zerrin Torun, Ph.D.

Lecturer at the Center for European Studies and

Department of International Relations

METU, Ankara

zerrin@metu.edu.tr

The following contribution analyzes whether and how the innovations brought about by the Lisbon Treaty can improve EU-Turkish relations, which continue to remain stagnant. Further, the analysis questions the relevance of institutional changes and flexible cooperation possibilities under the new framework and their implications for EU-Turkey relations. Permanent structured cooperation, enhanced cooperation, the European External Action Service, the Office of the High Representative, and the Delegation of the Union to Turkey are the primary institutions, actors, and mechanisms that could be deployed to improve such relations. Official or treaty changes are potentially significant in raising discourse to a higher level, particularly in the realm of a permanent structured cooperation or enhanced cooperation mechanisms. However, due to the respective Member State positions (and their veto power), EU-Turkey relations continue to be limited to informal, albeit innovative, dialogue within the traditional framework of cooperation and under the logic of enlargement. Relations, however, are kept to a minimum, and in general seem to be waiting for things to sort themselves out. A more positive agenda has been launched between the Commission and Turkey, with the objective to re-open the currently blocked accession negotiation chapters. However, progress is slow.

On the other hand, the European External Action Service and the political dialogue with the Office of the High Representative, despite facilitating an adequate exchange of information, suffer from a lack of visibility and tangible outcomes. Turkey's recent foreign policy activism, particularly on issues where it conflicted with the EU, and the stagnation of the accession negotiations suggest that improved strategic cooperation would be beneficial for both. This would provide a sustainable modicum of communication, decrease potential divergence, and produce tangible outcomes. As the visions, methods, values, and concerns seem to overlap, it should be easier to facilitate cooperation in this particular policy area. Nonetheless, it seems that there appears no other option than continuing the political dialogue mechanism established after the Lisbon Treaty, which consists of a few annual high-level meetings, mainly as a means to exchange opinions between the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs and the High Representative of the EU. As Turkish policymakers frequently underline, the country was once regularly invited to European summits before 2004. However, since then (when Cyprus acceded to the EU), this has not been the case. In such a setting, it is difficult to conceive of an informal mechanism that would reassure Turkey and make it more cooperative. Moreover, it is doubtful that such informal instruments can secure any convergence of EU positions and those of a country that is anything

but a candidate; this is especially true as Member States do not hesitate to override the EU when it comes to foreign and security policies.

The current challenges working against improved EU-Turkish relations may be yet another example of where the EU has a hard time in compiling a flexible and efficient response into action, particularly while the international system moves towards multi-polarity. This change in the international system is the main reason why today's challenges should be dealt with foresight rather than short-sighted prescriptions that focus on finding temporary solutions to immediate problems. In this context, the EU's ultimate challenge is how to deal with emerging powers and a so-called 'post-Western' world. One may soon expect to see a fluid and cross-cutting pattern of alliances and cooperative mechanisms, where balance of power concerns will influence prospects of a working multilateralism and regional institutionalization(s). Therefore, although Western dominance and influence may still be a characteristic of the future international system, it is going to become a bigger challenge for the West to preserve the current status quo. The necessity to accommodate the demands, needs, and even values of the rising powers will be a major source of tension in the West's quest to maintain its hierarchy.

In this sense, it seems crucial to break the deadlock in the realm of foreign, security, and defence policies between Turkey and the EU, which of course leads one to question why some Member States are content with prolonging the Cyprus conflict, or object to new ways of institutionalised cooperation. A formal, structured, and inclusive mechanism would give a sense of respect to Turkish policymakers and citizens alike, and help to alleviate problems of distrust. As such, facilitating permanent structured and/or enhanced cooperation between the EU and a candidate country is very much needed. Such an arrangement would offer the necessary reassurances that when both the EU and Turkey are ready, membership will still be on the agenda (even if it is in the distant future), and simultaneously minimize mutual distrust in the meantime. However, it is unlikely that such a scheme would be accepted by Cyprus. Therefore, in order to gain more breathing room in relations, the Union might consider what it can do to decrease the impact of the long-unresolved conflict in Cyprus, particularly where it pertains to Turkish accession negotiations.

Nonetheless, the institutional structure established by the Lisbon Treaty is in place for Member States to take advantage of and respond to potential challenges and risks in these types of situations. The mechanisms of enhanced cooperation and permanent structured cooperation can potentially unleash 'coalitions of the willing' within the Union. These can subsequently create examples for Member States and third countries to join together. Further, such mechanisms can be used to overcome both the financial crisis and divisions within foreign, security, and defence policies if the political will is enough to find flexible, innovative, inclusive, and efficient responses to the challenges.

The objective, therefore, should be to take advantage of the differences, not only within Europe but also between Europe and its partners, since this can be the most effective response to the demands of the emerging powers. As it is in the EU's best interest to reinforce its partnerships and unblock gridlocks, eradicating divisions not only between the Member States, but also in

relations between the EU and third countries may help solve immediate problems and create momentum for improved and long-term interdependencies in an increasingly multi-polar system.

Bibliography

Eralp, A.; Torun, Z., Turkey - EU relations: just another impasse?, in D. Bechev (ed.), *What does Turkey think?*, European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), London, June 2011, 57-61.

Leonard, M., Europe's Multipolar Neighborhood, Commentary, *Strategic Europe*, 30 September 2011, available at: <http://carnegieeurope.eu/publications/?fa=45650>

de Vasconcelos, A. (ed.), *Citizens in an interconnected and polycentric world: global trends 2030*, European Union Institute for Security Studies, Paris, October 2011.

Power-sharing between EUSR and OHR in Bosnia and Herzegovina

Senada Šelo Šabić, PhD.

Research Associate at the Institute for International Relations- IRMO, Zagreb

senada@irmo.hr

Since December 2005, the international community has overseen and facilitated the implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA) in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). The original intention behind this engagement was never to turn BiH into a protectorate, but rather to assist the local forces in rebuilding their country after the devastating war. The presence of international military and diplomatic forces, coupled with aid assistance and donor funding, was clearly a short-term solution; the goal was to transfer implementation competencies to national figures and institutions as soon as possible. Yet after sixteen years, the international community remains the primary political actor in BiH.

The prevailing explanation is that the elites of the three ethnic communities continue to engage in inter-ethnic quarrels as a means to enhance their own power within their ethnic group. Of course, this comes at the expense of building a single and viable state of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The international community's long-term goal has been to integrate Bosnia and Herzegovina into the Euro-Atlantic structures. This 'final' step would cement BiH as a democratically consolidated, peaceful, and viable state.

From the very beginning, however, there has been a general perception that the goal of the international community was not necessarily shared by the three ethnic groups. Though admittedly a simplistic assessment, the differences among the three main ethnic groups in BiH have largely remained unchanged since the war ended: Bosniaks want a distinctively centralized state; Bosnian Croats want a third, Croat entity within BiH; and Bosnian Serbs want an independent entity within BiH, with the option of possible secession. This situation has led a number of authors to conclude that the DPA ended the actual fighting, but allowed the war to continue. Nonetheless, it is misleading to suggest that there have been no initiatives on the part of locals and no ownership of the state building process. On the contrary, there have been plenty of initiatives; unfortunately, they often assume directions opposite the goal of the international community.

In order to overcome local resistance, the international community has resorted to a range of measures. One transferred extensive powers to the High Representative (HR), vis-à-vis the Bonn Powers. Envisaged in Dayton to coordinate the implementation of the DPA among the different local and international stakeholders in BiH, the HR became the final arbitrator in the field as of 1997: he could override parliamentary decisions, enact laws, and dismiss elected officials if they obstructed the DPA's implementation.

The Office of the High Representative thus became the main driving force behind the implementation of the DPA and the building of a single, democratic state of BiH. The OHR promulgated laws on a common currency, common licence plates, the state emblem, the return of

refugees and property rights laws, telecommunication laws, and the integration of the electricity market. It lobbied for a constitutional court ruling that would grant equal rights to all citizens of the three ethnic groups throughout the country, and continues to lobby leaders of the main political parties to amend the constitution in light of the European Court of Human Rights' ruling on the Sejdić-Finci case.

In short, the Office of the High Representative (OHR) in BiH has been the ultimate decision-making and international policy-steering body for years. After nearly two decades, however, the context of engagement has changed, culminating in new challenges to which the "traditional" OHR and its original mandate could no longer address.

The active interventionism of the OHR has been heavily criticized. The body has been accused of: seeding dependency among the locals; being a poor coordinator among various international actors; demonstrating imperialistic tendencies; and even turning into a postmodern maharaja. At the same time, the frustration of weak local support for implementing the DPA in earnest, the mounting criticism of the OHR mandate, the interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq (which drew the US to these other crises), and the global economic crisis have all lead to the conclusion that the OHR should be closed, with the EU Special Representative taking over.

After all, Bosnia and Herzegovina, like the rest of the South East Europe, is a European 'problem'. Amidst the break-up of Yugoslavia, Europe infamously considered it its hour of history. As the conflict spread and intensified, the US intervened and brokered a series of agreements: between Bosniaks and Croats in BiH, creating the BiH Federation; the Dayton Agreement between the three warring parties; and the Agreement between Croats and Croatian Serbs on the peaceful reintegration of Eastern Slavonia. All these pointed to the failure of the EU to handle the problems in its own periphery. Thus, as the US withdrew from the frontlines after the DPA's implementation in the early 2000s, the EU reassumed its responsibilities. This is particularly important for three reasons:

- 1) The end goal of the DPA is the integration of BiH into Euro-Atlantic structures, which is considered final and decisive proof that the country is set firmly on the path of peace, stability, and prosperity.
- 2) In the decade following the end of the war in BiH, the EU has undergone profound changes, particularly where it concerns the Lisbon Treaty. The streamlining of the EU's diplomatic force and the creation of the European External Action Service is a step towards coordinated, coherent, and effective EU policy in BiH and elsewhere.
- 3) Despite their differences, the elites of the three ethnic groups in BiH all profess their commitment and support for European Union accession. It should be noted, there is no such unequivocal support for BiH joining NATO.

The gradual power shift of the international community in BiH, from the OHR to the double-hatted OHR-EUSR, to the EUSR and OHR, reflects an overall change in the 'responsibility' for Bosnia's fate. This contribution examines the 'separation of powers' of these two institutions in

order to understand the character of the present international engagement in the Bosnian peace process. The first 'autonomous' EU Special Representative (who is also the Head of the EU Delegation in BiH) assumed his post on September 1, 2011. The now streamlined and strengthened EUSR is expected to respond to the existing challenges. However, questions remain on the actual conditions needed in BiH, and whether or not the new position will be a prescription for success.

Has EU foreign policy become more coherent and coordinated? The case of the EEAS in the Kosovo crisis

Prof. Jovan Teokarević

Faculty of Political Sciences, University of Belgrade

jovan.teokarevic@fpn.bg.ac.rs

The EU's Kosovo policy accurately reflects the strengths and weaknesses of the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), as well as the newly mandated European External Action Service (EEAS). This assessment is based on at least seven different issues.

1) The first concerns whether there is, or whether there can be, a common EU "Kosovo policy". The simple fact is that a basic disagreement exists among Member States about the status of Kosovo. A five state minority (Cyprus, Greece, Romania, Slovakia, and Spain) does not recognise Kosovo's independence. Here, figures matter. A common policy certainly has an increased chance for success if the degree of unity on the key question is higher, if not unanimous. However, complete unity – obtained via consensus – is needed for decisions in this particular case, as it is for other issues within the EU's foreign policy domain. Yet harmony has been historically difficult to reach when it pertains to status issues. State recognitions are still firmly within the grasp of individual Member States, which subsequently leaves the EU's hands tied. The Union can only confirm that Member States themselves should follow their own interests, which in fact happened in February 2008, upon passage of Kosovo's Unilateral Declaration of Independence. Nevertheless, the controversy is an important challenge for the EU largely because of its long-term engagement in Kosovo and the renewed expectations generated from its independence from Serbia. Namely, there is general consensus that the EU should be involved in the solution of this conflict, despite the fact that it cannot achieve the full capacity of its mechanisms because of its own intergovernmental limitations.

2) Despite its uncomfortable position resulting from the internal divisions over Kosovo's status, the EU has responded affirmatively to the challenge and accepted a prominent role in international efforts to diffuse the conflict. More specifically, this is one of the first and most comprehensive challenges for the EEAS. Further, and contrary to many predictions, the EU has built its own "Kosovo policy" and has been active, ambitious, and to a large extent successful in implementing it. Cracks along the Kosovo status line have not seemed to affect the EU's overall policy, nor fundamentally diminish the common positions, even during times of crises and tension in 2011 (Serb barricades and conflicts with EULEX in northern Kosovo).

3) In addition, and at the same time an important extension of the original role planned for the EU in the Kosovo conflict, the EU has mediated negotiations between Belgrade and Pristina. This was one of the first significant and sensitive tasks for the EEAS; by and large, it has exceeded expectations. Negotiations resulted in several agreements that had asked for concessions on both sides. This proved that the EU could be an influential mediator under specific conditions and amongst specific actors, and that the EEAS could be an efficient entity if it receives a defined task and much needed autonomy within this framework. Results could be even better if – as suggested

– this task is transferred from the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, who has been directly involved in negotiations, to a special envoy of the Representative.

4) During the last year, an important new trend emerged within this set of issues. Kosovo-related criteria began to dominate the list of EU demands for Serbia, which it must meet if it wants to advance along the path of EU integration. As well, the initial phase of Kosovo’s European future was finally operationalised, a result of preparations that began and would lead towards the completion of the Feasibility Study, and separately through reforms that would allow Kosovar citizens visa-free entry into Schengen area countries. The EU has thus strengthened and streamlined its traditional *quid pro quo* perspective: delivery in reforms makes progress toward EU integration possible. This change is reflective of two important factors. First, Member States have obviously reached a consensus as to the urgency of dealing with Kosovo, i.e., the sooner the better. Second, there is finally evidence supporting the enhanced coordination between the EEAS and the European Commission; the former is principally in charge of foreign policy, and the latter manages conditionality policy, which is adjusted for each country in the accession process.

5) The changes noted above became possible because of the new relations between Member States and EU institutions, and particularly because of the increased significance of some Member States. Germany is certainly the case in point, since it is not only perceived at the moment as the EU’s sole leader, but in practice the country increasingly accepts this role. In addition to the economy, EU foreign policy has become an important area where German interests, and more practical policy recommendations and demands are being pushed and accepted as joint conclusions, particularly in situations when there is a lack of Member State consensus. With a now more determined and more detailed Kosovo-related conditionality policy against Serbia, EU policy signifies a heightened German interest and activism. Examining the new power relations within the EU and its institutions, and especially in terms of decision-making and coordination within the EEAS and between it, the European Commission, and the Council, suggests the need for increased research to uncover whether the EU is transforming itself into a multi-speed organization, and how this would affect the EEAS operations.

6) The EU’s involvement in and around Kosovo allows for some general considerations and conclusions which include the question as to whether the EEAS has performed as expected during the first two years of its existence. On one hand, one might argue that the EEAS has achieved functional autonomy from the Council and the Commission as expected. On the other side, the situation in Kosovo indicates that the overall coordination and coherence of the EU’s Kosovo policy has not proceeded without problems. Of course, this comes as no surprise. The EU’s mission in Kosovo is one of the world’s most complex foreign and security operations, and certainly the most ambitious the EU has ever embarked on. It involves a number of international actors (UNMIK, KFOR), and a number of states, particularly the US, who for many reasons maintains a prominent and influential role. The day-to-day, multilevel operative and decision-making coordination among the key international players in Kosovo is certainly a difficult goal to be achieved, but the available evidence suggests that much of this road has already been successfully traversed.

7) A further problem is coordination. This results from the complicated approach in which the EU presents itself in Kosovo. In sum, there is an EU Office in Kosovo, a separate EULEX office, and seventeen different Member State representative offices. Further complicating matters, the EU Office includes the EU Special Representative (EUSR), which at the same time is an integral part of the EEAS and the European Commission's representation in Pristina. Following the Lisbon Treaty's entry into force, the European Commission Liaison Office, jointly with the EUSR mandate, became the European Union Office in Kosovo. Before merging into the European Union Office, the European Commission Liaison Office had been functioning since September 2004, and the EUSR since 2008. EUSR, on the other hand, has had a simultaneous mandate – the International Civilian Representative, within the ICO, the International Civilian Office; however, the ICO withdrew on September 10, 2012, after supervising Kosovo's initial independence transfer. The EUSR is now more closely connected with the EU mission in Kosovo: the current EUSR in Kosovo, appointed in December 2011, is "double-hatted", serving simultaneously as the head of the EU Office in Kosovo. The overall expectation is that this will significantly reinforce the EU's presence in Kosovo, and introduce a higher level of coordination among the three representative parts there. In EU jargon, the EUSR is considered "the political commitment" of the EU, the EU Office "the reform driving commitment", and EULEX "the operation commitment". Coordinating all three on the same cause is indeed a formidable task that has more or less been handled properly to date. Yet further improvements are certainly welcome, not only for the sake of this particular EU mission, but also as a valuable experience for similar operations in the future.

**Relevance of the European External Action Service for the
EU's policies towards South East Europe**

Program

Venue: International University Centre – IUC, Dubrovnik, Don Frane Bulića 4, Dubrovnik,
Croatia

Date: Friday, October 5, 2012

9h – 9h15	Welcoming address - Višnja Samardžija, Ph.D., Institute for Development and International Relations – IRMO, Zagreb - Prof. Wolfgang Wessels, Jean Monnet Professor, University of Cologne
9h15 – 10h	Keynote speech - Jonas Jonsson, Head of the Division Western Balkans, European External Action Service, Bruxelles: <i>Perspectives of the Lisbon Treaty's EEAS in the Western Balkans</i> <i>Discussion</i>
10h – 11h30	Panel 1: <i>EEAS and visibility of EU foreign policy in the Western Balkans</i> Moderator: Prof. Wolfgang Wessels, Jean Monnet Professor, University of Cologne - Wolfgang Koeth, European Institute of Public Administration, Maastricht: <i>Streamlining of policies or additional level of complexity? The impact of the EEAS on EU – Western Balkans relations</i> - Tanja Tamminen, Ph.D., Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA): <i>Impact of the EU crisis management efforts in the Western Balkans</i> - Michele Comelli, Ph.D., Istituto di Affari Internazionali : <i>Looking for coherence in European foreign policy: the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the Balkans</i> <i>Roundtable Discussion</i>
11h30 – 11h45	Pause
11h45 – 13h15	Panel 2: <i>EEAS - enlargement to the Western Balkans and beyond</i> Moderator: Višnja Samardžija, Ph.D., Institute for Development and International Relations – IRMO, Zagreb - Ines Troha Brdar, Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs of the Republic of Croatia: <i>EEAS and the Western Balkans region – What has the new Service brought to the region?</i>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Valentin Petroussenko, Ph.D., Jean Monnet Lecturer at the Plovdiv University: <i>New meaning of the EEAS and full use of flexible diplomacy in the frames of mechanisms of negotiations in the Western Balkans</i> - Prof. Atila Eralp and Zerrin Torun, Ph.D., METU, Ankara: <i>Re-visiting Turkey-EU relations in light of the Lisbon Treaty</i> <p><i>Roundtable Discussion</i></p>
13h15 – 14h30	Lunch
14h30 – 16h	<p>Panel 3: <i>EEAS – views form the region</i></p> <p>Moderator: Hrvoje Butković, Ph.D., Institute for Development and International Relations – IRMO, Zagreb</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Senada Šelo Šabić, Ph.D., Institute for Development and International Relations - IRMO, Zagreb: <i>Power-sharing between EUSR and OHR in Bosnia and Herzegovina</i> - Prof. Jovan Teokarević, Faculty of Political Science, Belgrade: <i>Has EU foreign policy become more coherent and coordinated? – The case of the EEAS in the Kosovo crisis</i> - Momčilo Radulović, President of the European Movement in Montenegro: <i>EEAS - WB governments - Civil societies of the WB countries - a triangle to facilitate</i> <p><i>Roundtable Discussion</i></p>
16h – 17h	<p>Panel 4: <u>Conclusions and final discussion</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Višnja Samardžija, Ph.D. - Prof. Wolfgang Wessels - Hrvoje Butković, Ph.D.
17h-18h30	Sightseeing Dubrovnik
20h	Dinner